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1.1 Introduction: The Consensus ‘Game’
‘Consensus’ is a ‘riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma’.1 It has
various meanings,2 is used in miscellaneous contexts and for a variety of
purposes, and may therefore perform diverse roles. The core component
that remains constant across its different deﬁnitions, conceptions and
uses is the existence of some sort of agreement that enables the ‘making’
of a decision. Yet, the precise nature and extent of the agreement that
underpins consensus is elusive. It spans from anything between a broad,
shared understanding (in the sense of concurrence, like-mindedness
or general opinion) to (explicit or implied) unanimity that entails a veto
power for anyone who participates in the consensus-making process.
Different shades of consensus exist between the two extremes of this
continuum, depending on the ‘looseness’ or ‘rigidity’ of the rules of its
formation.
The pluralism or ambiguity – depending on one’s point of view – in
the conceptualisation of consensus is but one of the complexities with
which it is fraught. Even if one were to ignore or avoid the deﬁnitional
pitfalls, consensus cannot become fully operational as a decision-making
tool unless the ‘rules of the game’ have been established: who are the
eligible ‘players’, what are the conditions of validity for its formulation,
what is the effect of a consensus/no-consensus outcome, and who is the
arbiter of the outcome, that is, who has the authority to recognise the
1 This famous turn of phrase is borrowed from Winston Churchill, who used it in a BBC
radio broadcast on 1st October 1939 to describe Russia’s unpredictable reactions. See
www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/RusnEnig.html.
2 See the chapters contained in Part I of this book, and especially Chapters 4 and 8 by
C. Djeffal and S. Douglas-Scott, respectively.
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existence of consensus? Clarity in outlining these ‘contours’ of consensus
translates into (legal) certainty on its modus operandi and its outputs.
The ‘contours’, of course, are arguably as important as its deﬁnition, as
together they are necessary conditions for the functionality of consensus
and for its effectiveness. Consensus as a decision-making tool, therefore,
encapsulates a paradox: its ability to operate effectively is predicated
on the existence of consensus3 on its meaning and on the layout of its
‘contours’. And this inevitably requires an authority4 that will set the
rules of the ‘game’.
Speaking of games, the allure of consensus apparently transcends the
boundaries of academic discourse, judging from the homonymous board
game that relies on the assumption that in any given group of people,
even the most trivial question is bound to attract a variety of different
responses.5 The rules of the board game are simple. Each player must
vote which of the nouns on their common list best matches the adjective
on the board. The answer favoured by the majority of players wins. Thus,
in the ‘Consensus’ game, the majority rules6 and the designer of the game
is the authority that deﬁnes the meaning, function and purpose of the
term ‘consensus’, as well as the framework in which consensus operates
(e.g., the conditions of validity for ‘contributing’ to a consensus outcome,
the rules regarding the recognition of a consensus outcome, and the
conditions of eligibility for potential players).
This book explores consensus in the context of the system of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Within this system,
the ‘players’ of the European consensus (EuC) ‘game’ are prima facie7 the
signatories to that instrument. The designer of the consensus ‘game’ and,
hence, its rule-setter, is the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
This raises two interconnected sets of questions: the ﬁrst concerns the
3 The intentional pun, which has also inspired the title of this book and its introduction, is
gratefully borrowed from L. Wildhaber, A. Hjartarson and S. Donnelly, ‘No consensus on
consensus? The practice of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2013) 33 Human
Rights Law Journal 248–63.
4 See footnote 61. See also V. P. Tzevelekos and K. Dzehtsiarou, ‘International custom
making and the ECtHR’s European consensus method of interpretation’ (2016) 16
European Yearbook of Human Rights 313–44.
5 See http://consensusgame.com/index.php.
6 As the box cover of the board game eloquently points out.
7 See Section 1.3.1 regarding the constitutive role that the ECtHR may have in the con-
struction of EuC.
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‘game’ itself and its rules; the second relates to the value of the ‘game’ in
the context of (international) human rights adjudication. These two sets
of questions broadly correspond to the ﬁrst and second Parts of this book,
respectively, although the borders between the two are inevitably porous,
as attested by several of the chapters contained therein.8 The third Part of
the book explores the transferability of EuC in other juridical contexts
or its comparability with potentially analogous methods employed in
different legal systems within and outside Europe, both at the national
and the inter/supra-national level.
The remainder of this introductory note is structured as follows.
Section 1.2 offers a brief overview of EuC, with the express caveat that
its aim is not to convey certainties as to the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of EuC.
Had such certainty existed, this book and the scholarly work it hosts
would perhaps be redundant. We intentionally limit the overview to what
we consider the necessary minimum that readers with no prior know-
ledge of EuC will require to approach the rest of the chapters with some
conﬁdence. As such, our outline leaves several questions unanswered and
should be read with a critical eye. As all aspects of EuC are open to
competing and often conﬂicting interpretations, any attempt to draw a
conceptual map can (and should) be open to challenge – and challenging
existing knowledge and presumed certainties on EuC is one of the main
objectives of this book. To that end, our outline is primarily designed to
raise some of (the very many) questions pertaining to the function,
evaluation and transferability of EuC, and to pave the way for the critical
analysis that will follow. Section 1.3 endeavours to explain why any
attempt to build consensus on EuC is bound to face signiﬁcant hurdles
and to identify the causes of the diverging academic opinions on EuC. It
also offers a justiﬁcation of our (partial) ‘agnosticism’ vis-à-vis EuC and
of our reluctance to provide a more detailed overview of its role and
function in this introduction. Section 1.4 describes the contribution this
book aspires to make and lays down signposts to guide readers through
the structure and the main questions discussed in each of the three Parts.
Section 1.5 concludes by acknowledging the limits and limitations of the
book, while issuing a rallying call for more research on (European)
consensus in human rights adjudication.
8 See, for example, the chapters in the book by K. Dzehtsiarou (Chapter 2), L. Van den
Eynde (Chapter 5), K. Henrard (Chapter 7), A. Follesdal (Chapter 9), T. Kleinlein
(Chapter 10) and F. de Londras (Chapter 14).
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1.2 EuC at a Glance
The text of the ECHR is general and abstract by design. It is destined to
acquire its concrete normative content and produce tangible effects when
its laconic provisions are brought to bear on the facts of a speciﬁc case
through judicial interpretation. In performing this task, the ECtHR can
avail itself of a plethora of interpretive methods, techniques and tools.
Some of these methods are available to all (international) courts and can
be found in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT).9 They include resorting to the travaux of the ECHR as a means
to identify the original will of the signatories10 or investigating the
ordinary meaning of a term appearing in the text of the ECHR.11 Other
interpretive tools may be common across different systems, but acquire a
particular gravitas in the ECHR system because of the latter’s ‘special-
ity’12 as a ‘constitutional’ instrument enshrining foundational European
values.13 This is, for instance, the case with the use of the ‘object and
purpose’ of human rights law as an interpretive signpost associated with
9 VCLT, Articles 31–33. On the interrelationship and possible overlap between the
methods contained in the VCLT and EuC, see, in this book, the chapters by
J. Větrovský (Chapter 6), A. Follesdal (Chapter 9) and especially C. Djeffal (Chapter 4).
10 VCLT, Article 32. See, for example, Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others (Appl.
no. 52207/99), decision on admissibility, 12 December 2001, paras 19–21, 58, 63 and 65;
Nolan and K. v. Russia (Appl. no. 2512/04), Judgment, 12 February 2009, paras 48
and 110.
11 VCLT, Article 31(1). See, for example, Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others,
para. 65. In this book, see the chapters by L. Lixinski (Chapter 15), C. Djeffal (Chapter 4)
and especially J. Větrovský (Chapter 6).
12 The term ‘special’ is used here not in the sense of lex specialis, but to denote the distinctive
importance of (international) human rights law. This distinctiveness is reﬂected in the
classiﬁcation of international human rights rules as obligations erga omnes and in the
legal effects that this class of obligations produces (in particular, collective enforcement).
See ILC, A/CN.4/L.682, Fragmentation of International Law: Difﬁculties Arising from the
Diversiﬁcation and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the
International Law Commission, Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, Fifty eighth session, 1
May–9 June and 3 July–11 August 2006, paras 380–409 and, for human rights as a special
regime of international law (i.e., a question that partially overlaps with speciality as lex
specialis), paras 128–33 and 161–4.
13 ECHR’s speciality is linked with the idea of a regional, European public order and
transforms the ECHR into a regional ‘constitutional’ instrument. See, for example,
Chrysostomos, Papachrysostomou and Loizidou v. Turkey (Appl. nos. 15299/89, 15300/
89 and 15318/89), decision on admissibility, 4 March 1991, paras 20 and 22; Loizidou
v. Turkey (Appl. no. 15318/89), judgment (on preliminary objections), 23 March 1995,
para. 75.
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the teleological method of interpretation.14 Finally, one can also identify
tools of interpretation that are exclusive to the ECtHR.15 Whether or not
EuC is, indeed, one such tool, is very much an open question. Strong
arguments could be made that similar methods of interpretation are well
established in other legal systems,16 or that EuC overlaps with and may
even be seen as a particular type of the evolutive/dynamic method of
interpretation, which clearly extends beyond the conﬁnes of the ECHR
system.17 But this is not a question that we wish to consider here. Instead,
what we argue is that EuC is, perhaps, not exclusive to the ECHR system,
but is certainly an idiosyncratically European method of interpretation.
This is not only because EuC, as a method (or a set of methods18) of
interpretation, has been ‘invented’ and developed by the ECtHR, but also
because its raison d’être is to act as a barometer of evolution primarily,
if not exclusively, within the European continent. This raises complex
questions regarding the precise role EuC must play in the ECHR inter-
pretive ecosystem, especially in view of its seemingly symbiotic
14 VCLT, Article 31(1). In the ECHR system, the object and purpose of the Convention are
associated with the principle of effectiveness, that is, the Convention’s effet utile, and the
idea that the rights it enshrines ought to be ‘practical and effective, not theoretical and
illusory’. See the origins of the principle of effectiveness in Marckx v. Belgium (Appl.
no. 6833/74), judgment, 13 June 1979, para. 31; Airey v. Ireland (Appl. no. 6289/73),
judgment, 9 October 1979, para. 24.
15 For instance, the margin of appreciation doctrine (footnote 68) or the autonomous
interpretation (originating from Engels and others v. the Netherlands, Appl. nos. 5100/
71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/72, judgment, 8 June 1976, para. 81) are, arguably,
unique to the ECHR system, in the sense that they have been created by the ECtHR
(irrespective of possible subsequent ‘spill-over’ to other legal systems).
16 See all the chapters in Part III of this book.
17 In the ECHR system, evolutive interpretation is associated with the living instrument
doctrine, which requires the Convention to be interpreted in light of present-day condi-
tions. It originates from Tyrer v. the United Kingdom (Appl. no. 5856/72), judgment,
25 April 1978, para. 31. On evolutive interpretation, see footnote 66. See also VCLT,
Article 31(3)(c), V. P. Tzevelekos, ‘The use of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT in the case-law
of the ECtHR. An effective anti-fragmentation tool or a selective loophole for the
reinforcement of the teleology of human rights? Between evolution and systemic integra-
tion’ (2010) 31 Michigan Journal of International Law 621–90 and ILC, A/CN.4/L.682,
paras 410–80.
18 According to Dzehtsiarou, for instance, consensus can be classiﬁed into four types:
consensus stemming from the comparative analysis of the laws and practice of the
signatories to the ECHR, consensus based on international treaties, internal consensus
within the respondent state(s), and (scientiﬁc) consensus among experts. K. Dzehtsiarou,
European Consensus and the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 39–56. See also Wildhaber, Hjartarson
and Donnelly, ‘No consensus on consensus?’, 252–6.
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relationship with the evolutive method of interpretation,19 but also in
situations in which European and international trends are not moving in
the same direction.20
A common hypothesis is that the ECtHR is particularly keen on
employing the EuC method when it is faced with (morally, politically
or socially) sensitive, controversial or ambiguous questions. It is well
known that the Court enjoys discretion in choosing the most appropriate
method(s) of interpretation for each case. But it is exactly this discretion
that makes it difﬁcult to pinpoint what triggers the use of EuC in some
cases but not in others and makes it even more difﬁcult to gauge whether
EuC is being used consistently across different types of issues involving
different Convention rights. This is all the more troubling when one
considers that the function of EuC is such that the ECtHR will often
resort to it in order to identify the emergence (or not) of a common
standard with regard to a particular question of interpretation. It is
evident, then, that the issues of selectivity and (in)consistency in the
use of EuC are but the tip of a pretty sizeable iceberg. In fact, the list of
questions is virtually endless, ranging from the more abstract philosoph-
ical difﬁculties in ﬁxing the position of EuC within the normative
foundations of the ECHR and in establishing the authority of the Court
to rely on it, to the more ‘technical’ problems of deciphering the ‘ingredi-
ents’ that make up EuC,21 detecting the types of human rights questions
that are suitable for consensus analysis and ascertaining whether ‘con-
sensus exclusion zones’ may exist within the Convention.22 Per our
earlier disclaimer, we will tread with caution and refrain from taking a
19 For instance, all the chapters in this book refer to the interrelationship between the
margin of appreciation and EuC. See in particular the chapters by S. Douglas-Scott
(Chapter 8), A. Follesdal (Chapter 9), K. Henrard (Chapter 7) and especially
T. Kleinlein (Chapter 10). See also footnote 68. Regarding evolutive interpretation and
its interrelationship with EuC, see, in this volume, for example, the chapters by C. Djeffal
(Chapter 4), K. Henrard (Chapter 7), A. Follesdal (Chapter 9) and T. Kleinlein (Chap-
ter 10). See also footnote 66.
20 See, for example, Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom (Appl. no. 28957/95),
judgment, 11 July 2002, paras 84–5, where the absence of EuC was ‘remedied’ by the
existence of an international trend that trumped European states’ practice.
21 See footnote 18.
22 This is often associated in the literature with counter-majoritarian approaches to human
rights, especially regarding the protection of minority rights. In this book, see especially
the chapter by D. Kagiaros (Chapter 13). More generally, inter alia, see the seminal works
by E. Benvenisti, ‘Margin of appreciation, consensus, and universal standards’ (1999) 31
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 843–54 at 848–53;
G. Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights
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stance on any of these questions here. Sufﬁce it to say that, among a
plethora of possible components,23 EuC consists in the comparative
analysis of the prevailing legal trends and common understandings of a
right, with a principal focus on the national legal orders of the signatory
parties.24 The core element of EuC, therefore, is, arguably, practice at the
national level, which, in turn, raises yet another set of questions regarding
the nature of such practice, the threshold numbers of states needed for a
consensus ﬁnding, and the thoroughness, transparency and methodo-
logical robustness of the comparative exercise undertaken by the ECtHR
for the purposes of EuC.
In so far as the effects of EuC are concerned, things are somewhat
clearer. Although one might still argue that the picture is not entirely free
from inconsistencies,25 it is possible to suggest that, in principle, if the
Court diagnoses consensus, it permits itself to establish pan-European
standards that are binding on all states under its jurisdiction.26 In this
regard, EuC may be seen as a tool to expand the semantic scope of the
ECHR, possibly beyond the rights that are explicitly included in its text.27
In the absence of EuC, states and their national authorities enjoy a wider
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), especially chapters 3, 5 and 6; Dzehtsiarou,
European Consensus, especially pp. 116–29. See also footnote 51.
23 See footnote 18.
24 See, for example, Konstantin Markin v. Russia (Appl. no. 30078/06), judgment, 22 March
2012, paras 71–5 and 140.
25 The obvious example is A, B & C, where the Court went against EuC. See A, B & C
v. Ireland (Appl. no. 25579/05), judgment, 16 December 2010, especially paras 231–37.
See, in this book, the chapter by F. de Londras (Chapter 14) and her illuminating
discussion of A, B & C.
26 See, for instance, Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly (2000) Execution of
Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. Resolution 1226, para. 3, http://
assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-DocDetails-EN.asp?FileID=16834&lang=EN. ‘The
principle of solidarity implies that the case-law of the Court forms part of the Conven-
tion, thus extending the legally binding force of the Convention erga omnes (to all the
other parties). This means that the states parties not only have to execute the judgments
of the Court pronounced in cases to which they are party, but also have to take into
consideration the possible implications which judgments pronounced in other cases may
have for their own legal system and legal practice’.
27 In Vallianatos, for instance, the ECtHR relied on EuC to conclude that the respondent
state had violated Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the ECHR because it
excluded same-sex couples from the scope of legislation recognising a ‘civil union’ as
an ofﬁcial form of partnership other than marriage. The right to a civil union as an
alternative to marriage is not explicitly prescribed in Article 8 ECHR. See Vallianatos and
Others (Appl. nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09), judgment, 7 November 2017, especially
para. 91.
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margin of appreciation28 and the ECtHR typically applies a looser pro-
portionality test in determining the lawfulness of national rules and of
executive, administrative or judicial practice that may limit Convention
rights.29 Therefore, it is possible to argue that the Court exercises judicial
self-restraint and, in doing so, it favours the regulatory autonomy of
national authorities by empowering them to decide on the matter at issue
domestically. This may be described as an expression of the principle of
subsidiarity.30 As a result, in the absence of EuC, Europe may accommo-
date multiple human rights standards in the spirit of (constitutional)
pluralism.31
We conclude this overview by reiterating that the controversy sur-
rounding EuC and the lack of clarity on its meaning, normative place and
modus operandi cannot be overplayed.32 Our brief tour d’horizon was
designed to cover the core of EuC, with a view to providing readers with
28 See, for example, Chapman v. the United Kingdom (Appl. no. 27238/95), judgment,
18 January 2001, paras 93 and 104.
29 Evans v. the United Kingdom (Appl. no. 6339/05), judgment, 10 April 2007, para. 77;
Dickson v. the United Kingdom (Appl. no. 44362/04), judgment, 4 December 2007,
para. 78.
30 See Article 1 of the 15th Protocol to the ECHR (not yet entered into force) and the
connection it establishes between the margin of appreciation and subsidiarity. See also the
Brighton declaration, paras 11 and 12, and especially 12(b). European Court of Human
Rights, ‘High level conference on the future of the European Court of Human Rights’
(19–20 April 2012), www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_Brighton_FinalDeclaration_
ENG.pdf. See also A. Mowbray, ‘Subsidiarity and the European Convention on Human
Rights’ (2015) 15 Human Rights Law Review 313–41.
31 On constitutional pluralism, see N. Krisch, ‘The open architecture of European human
rights law’ (2008) 71 The Modern Law Review 183. N. Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism:
The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). For
an overview, comparing constitutional pluralism with the constitutionalisation narrative,
see L. Lixinski, ‘Taming the Fragmentation Monster through Human Rights? Inter-
national Constitutionalism, “Pluralism Lite” and the Common Territory of the Two
European Legal Orders’, in V. Kosta et al. (eds.), The EU Accession to the ECHR (Oxford:
Hart, 2014), pp. 219–33. For a collection of essays on constitutional pluralism regarding
the EU and beyond that legal order, see M. Avbelj and J. Komaˊrek (eds.), Constitutional
Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Oxford: Hart, 2012). In this book,
see especially the chapters by S. Douglas-Scott (Chapter 8) and L. Van den Eynde
(Chapter 5).
32 As a former President of the Court has authoritatively explained, no full consensus
exists on consensus partly because the ‘Court’s case-law is in some respects ﬂuid and
even fuzzy’ (Wildhaber, Hjartarson and Donnelly, ‘No consensus on consensus?’, 262).
It is inevitable, then, that different authors in this book ‘read’ consensus in different
ways. Compare, for instance, the chapters by J. Větrovský (Chapter 6) and O. Bassok
(Chapter 11), or the chapters by the latter author (in so far as the concept of public
conﬁdence is concerned) and T. Kleinlein (Chapters 11 and 10, respectively).
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little or no background knowledge a basic understanding of the object of
this book. We also tried to offer a glimpse of the nature and volume of
questions raised by the conceptualisation and modus operandi of EuC.
The next section of this introductory chapter identiﬁes the inherent
challenges when attempting to study EuC. Its tripartite structure mirrors
the division of the book into three Parts.
1.3 Building Consensus on EuC: Mission Impossible?
1.3.1 Impediments to the Conceptualisation of EuC
As already explained, it is the ECtHR that invented the term ‘European
consensus’ and developed it as an interpretive technique. This entails that
the Court enjoys considerable discretion in choosing when to use EuC
together with or instead of other methods of interpretation, in deﬁning
what consensus consists in and in evaluating the evidence on conver-
gence of standards in Europe and beyond.33 Along the same lines, it is the
Court that deﬁnes the parameters of the legal question on which consen-
sus is sought, and it is the Court that decides which elements should be
taken into account for the purposes of that inquiry.34
Yet the designer and game master of the EuC ‘game’ has not (yet)
provided a full, clear and detailed ‘manual’ on the deﬁnition of consensus
and on the rules and outputs of the game.35 Although the ECHR moni-
toring system has used the EuC technique from the 1970s onwards,36 no
comprehensive and authoritative guidance has been forthcoming. For
instance, although it is evident that a considerable number of states must
have developed a common practice for EuC to emerge, it is unclear where
the cut-off point is (i.e., how many states will be required to reach the
33 Tzevelekos and Dzehtsiarou, ‘International custom making’, 325.
34 As to the discretion the ECtHR enjoys regarding the legal question it will examine, see the
dissenting opinion of Judge Tulkens in Leyla Şahin v. Turkey (Appl. no. 44774/98),
judgment, 10 November 2005, para. 3 of the opinion. See also Dzehtsiarou, European
Consensus, pp. 109–10.
35 We only have limited knowledge based on sporadic guidance provided by the Court and
on the work of scholars, who establish hypotheses that lead to varied interpretations as to
what EuC is and how it operates.
36 Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, para. 31;Marckx v. Belgium (Appl. no. 6833/74), judgment,
13 June 1979, para. 41; Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom (Appl. no. 7525/76), judgment,
22 October 1981, para 60. On the origins of EuC in the practice of the ECHR institutions,
and especially of the European Commission on Human Rights, see the chapter by
E. Bates (Chapter 3) in this volume.
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‘consensus’ threshold).37 In the same vein, no detailed explanation has
been provided regarding the different ‘shades’ of consensus and how
these may correspond to the different terms that make up the ‘consensus
lexicon’ employed by the ECtHR.38 This might be due to a lack of
consensus39 (in the sense of an absence of unanimous agreement) among
the ECtHR judges, which would hardly be surprising, given their
number, the fact that they do not all sit in a single plenary formation
and the fact that they do not serve for life. But (our) ignorance about EuC
might also be the result of a strategic choice on the part of the ECtHR.
The absence of a ‘manual’ on EuC entails increased ﬂexibility in its use
and the ensuing trade-off between judicial discretion and legal certainty,
foreseeability and consistency may be what the Court is after when
offering its sporadic guidance.40 Either way, it is scholarship that strives
to bridge this gap by observing the Court’s normative attitude and trying
to extrapolate the rules of the consensus ‘game’ from it. Hypothesising
and extrapolating, however, comes at a price. When no analytical evalu-
ation of EuC can be premised on an authoritative foundation of the
Court’s own making, it is inevitable that our understanding of EuC will
remain partial and fragmented, even in so far as its most basic conceptual
and functional elements are concerned.41
Scholars are not alone, of course, in attempting to cover this lacuna.
National governments and their civil service, human rights lawyers
representing victims of violations, civil society organisations (especially
37 What we know for certain is that unanimity is not required for the establishment of EuC,
although some type of majority will more often than not be deemed necessary. See, for
example, Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom (Appl. no. 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/
10), judgment, 9 July 2013, paras 68 and 117, where the Court relied on the practice of the
large majority of the contracting states. There are instances in the practice of the Court
where the identiﬁcation of a tendency towards emerging EuC (Schalk and Kopf v. Austria,
Appl. no. 30141/04, judgment, 24 June 2010, para. 105) or of emerging consensus per se
(Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, para. 84) was not sufﬁcient to reach the
consensus threshold.
38 See the Preface in this book by Judge C. L. Rozakis, as well as the chapter by K. Henrard
(Chapter 7), who explores the wealth of linguistic choices to which the ECtHR resorts in
order to engage with consensus analysis. See also Wildhaber, Hjartarson and Donnelly,
‘No consensus on consensus?’, 257–8.
39 For the ‘copyright’ of this play on words, see footnote 3.
40 See, for example, footnotes 28, 29 and 37 on elements of such guidance.
41 Such ambiguity is evident, for instance, when considering whether elements outside of
the practice of the signatories to the ECHR (such as expert opinion or scientiﬁc know-
ledge, and trends informed by the practice of actors outside Europe) can be taken into
account for the formulation of consensus. See also footnote 18.
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when acting as third-party interveners before the ECtHR42) and human
rights victims themselves are all contributing to the continuous ‘writing’
of the EuC rulebook. Even with help from all its stakeholders, however,
the task of conceptualising, delimiting and deciphering EuC remains
arduous. Trying to gauge where consensus ﬁts in the ECtHR interpretive
universe43 brings to the fore the methodological challenges of dealing
with big data – in this case, the tens of thousands of judgments and
decisions that constitute the body of ECtHR jurisprudence.44 How cer-
tain can one be that one’s evaluation of EuC is insulated from selection
bias in the choice of the sample?
The challenge of putting together the EuC rulebook in the absence of
authoritative guidance by the ECtHR is even greater when one considers
that EuC may be something of a ‘moving target’, as its deﬁnition,
function and conditions of usage evolve in the jurisprudence of the
Court.45 It is, of course, yet another paradox that an interpretive tool
intended to capture evolution and to align the content of the ECHR
accordingly is itself subject to evolution. But this paradox is, in fact,
inevitable given that EuC has been a feature of the ECHR system for
several decades46 and has been used by scores of judges in dealing with
diverse legal questions. The organic way in which EuC is gradually
evolving within the ECHR system, then, is reminiscent of the Rawlsian
reﬂective equilibrium:47 the outputs of EuC depend on the rules of the
consensus ‘game’, but these rules are in turn conditioned and shaped by
the outputs. It is natural to assume that the results of consensus analysis48
depend on the deﬁnition of EuC and on the rules governing its function.
This corresponds to a further assumption, namely that inductive
reasoning is at work here. However, there is no real guarantee that all
42 Which is the topic explored by L. Van den Eynde (Chapter 5) in this book.
43 Especially if one takes into account that the comparative legal analysis underpinning EuC
used to be appreciably weaker in the past. See Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus,
pp. 82–4, and Tzevelekos and Dzehtsiarou, ‘International custom making’, 319–23.
44 In that respect, see our call in the conclusions of this introductory note for quantitative
analysis and the references contained in footnote 89.
45 On the evolution of the comparative analysis undertaken by the ECtHR see footnote 43
and especially Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus, pp. 82–101.
46 See footnote 36.
47 For a different take on how John Rawls’ reﬂective equilibrium can be useful in under-
standing consensus analysis, see the chapter in this book by J. Theilen (Chapter 17).
48 The establishment, for instance, of a common European standard of protection (because
of EuC) or the recognition of a wide margin of appreciation (in the absence of EuC) that
allows for regulatory pluralism. See footnotes 27 and 28.
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ECtHR judges or all judgments employing EuC do indeed follow such an
inductive route. It may very well be the case that the concealed starting
point for some (or many) judges in some (or many) judgments is the
concrete standard they ﬁnd morally (or doctrinally) preferable in a
particular instance, which they then justify on the basis of EuC (through
a process of ‘reverse engineering’). This broadly deductive process is
bound to shape not only the ‘triggers’ of EuC, but also the scope of the
Court’s discretion in using consensus analysis. The danger of ending up
with a circular and somewhat muddled process is evident. When the
rules of the EuC ‘game’ are not known for certain in advance, it is not
easy to detect whether and when these rules change during the course of
a ‘game’.49 It is possible that the Court constructs the outputs of EuC by
constantly or occasionally (re-)constructing EuC itself as a method.
Either way, the underlying theoretical question as to whether the Court’s
function is constitutive of human rights standards (implying judicial
activism) or limited to a mere declaration (i.e., recognition) of human
rights standards shaped by EuC remains open.50
1.3.2 Impediments to the Normative Evaluation of EuC
The aim of Part II of the book is to provide a normative assessment
of EuC. Success in that task is inevitably undermined by the difﬁculties
of conceptualising EuC identiﬁed thus far. The absence of tangible
and robust empirical foundations and the lack of clarity around its
meaning and modus operandi make it difﬁcult to answer deﬁnitively
and unequivocally whether EuC should remain part of ECtHR’s toolbox.
But there is one more factor that adds to the complexity of this evaluative
task, especially if one bears in mind that consensus analysis is, more often
than not, drawn from the toolbox to address questions of a particularly
sensitive nature. Within the framework of the ECHR system, consensus
analysis operates on at least two different levels.
The ﬁrst level is that of human rights adjudication per se, irrespective,
that is, of whether such adjudication takes place before national or
49 See Tzevelekos and Dzehtsiarou, ‘International custom making’, 335–6, who make a
similar point regarding the power of courts to shape the deﬁnition of customary inter-
national law (which they compare to EuC).
50 Ibid., pp. 316, 317, 330–6. The question encompasses, of course, the way in which the
constitutive elements of EuC may have been assessed by the Court through the ‘lens’ of
EuC, which the Court itself constructs.
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supra/inter-national courts. When the answers to sensitive human rights
questions are heavily dependent on interpretive choices, the extent to
which judges should take account of the reality of socio-political major-
ities when making said choices is a ubiquitous dilemma in constitutional
democracies. In this context, EuC may be seen as a means for judges to
maintain a balance between ex cathedra decision making and decision
making informed by the democratic will of majorities (as expressed, for
instance, indirectly through parliamentary process or directly through
referenda).51
The second level on which EuC operates is that of international
(human rights) adjudication. The nature of the challenges that come
with this particular territory is obvious and well-rehearsed, as is the
ubiquitous need for international judges to show appropriate respect
for state sovereignty. This is the other potential role of EuC, which may
be seen as a way of ﬁnding acceptable compromises between the sover-
eign will of the ECHR signatories (especially when one takes into account
the interrelationship between EuC and the margin of appreciation) and
the decision-making power of the Court as the last-word, authoritative
interpreter of the Convention.
Distinguishing between these two levels, the constitutional and the
international, is far from easy, given the dual – international and quasi-
constitutional – nature of the Court itself.52 As if the picture was not
complex enough already, the apparent tensions on these different levels
are neither value-neutral nor immune to ideology. It follows that the
evaluation of EuC as a tool of interpretation will depend to an extent on
the philosophical preferences of the assessor (e.g., if s/he favours
principle-based or majority-stemming human rights standards or what
value and meaning s/he ascribes to state sovereignty) and also on the
51 The question of (counter-)majoritarianism in human rights protection and of the role of
EuC therein is omnipresent in the relevant literature. For some examples, see footnote 22.
The issue is also examined, to various extents, by several chapters in this book:
K. Dzehtsiarou (Chapter 2), C. Djeffal (Chapter 4), L. Van den Eynde (Chapter 5),
J. Větrovský (Chapter 6), S. Douglas-Scott (Chapter 8), A. Follesdal (Chapter 9),
T. Kleinlein (Chapter 10), O. Bassok (Chapter 11), D. Kagiaros (Chapter 13), F. de
Londras (Chapter 14), L. Lixinski (Chapter 15) and C. Gearty (Chapter 19).
52 Regarding the quasi-constitutional nature of the ECHR system, see footnotes 12 and 13.
From a very rich relevant literature, see in particular L. Wildhaber, ‘A constitutional
future for the European Court of Human Rights?’ (2002) 23(5–7) Human Rights Law
Journal 161–5; A. Stone Sweet, ‘On the constitutionalisation of the Convention. The
European Court of Human Rights as a constitutional court’, Faculty Scholarship Series,
Paper 71, 2009, available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/71.
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level (constitutional or international) the evaluation concerns.53 Cri-
tiques against EuC as a method of interpretation may, therefore, come
from opposite directions. Some may reject it on the grounds that it overly
restricts national regulatory autonomy and state sovereignty, while others
may view it as an obstacle to the interpretive recognition of common
principles.54 Such principles are seen as premised on the moral and
philosophical underpinnings of European human rights law, rather than
on the volatile will of states and the (majoritarian55) trends that may
prevail in Europe at any given time. Whether or not EuC is a legitimate
and successful tool remains, therefore, very much an open question and
one that is closely linked to the wider discourse on the philosophical
foundations of human rights56 and to the limits of judicial review.57
Assessing the legitimacy of EuC and, more generally, evaluating the
politics of judicial decision making at the post-national level is, in a
sense, tantamount to asking fundamental questions about where the
ultimate source of power and authority to decide on morally and politic-
ally sensitive human rights issues lies in liberal democratic polities.
There is one ﬁnal point to make regarding the difﬁculties in the
evaluation of EuC, this time concerning the relationship between EuC
and the legitimacy of the ECtHR. The literature on EuC, both more
generally58 and in this book in particular,59 points to legitimacy both
53 Discussing EuC on the same level of analysis is a conditio sine qua non if we are to avoid
arguments that fail to ‘speak’ in a common tongue.
54 In this regard, see the seminal work by Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation.
55 See footnotes 22 and 51.
56 For a general overview of the types of issues that the discourse on the philosophy of
human rights involves, see R. Cruft, S. Matthew Liao and M. Renzo, ‘The Philosophical
Foundations of Human Rights: An Overview’ in R. Cruft, S. Matthew Liao and M. Renzo
(eds), Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2015).
57 For an excellent recent study on the limits of the constitutional review of primary
legislation for its compatibility with human rights, see D. Kyritsis, Where Our Protection
Lies: Separation of Powers and Constitutional Review (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2017), especially chapter 6. See also G. Tsebelis, ‘The time inconsistency of long consti-
tutions’, Summer 2017 Bulletin, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, available at
www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=32914, explaining that the
more difﬁcult it is to amend a constitution (i.e., the more actors endowed with a veto
power the process involves), the more discretion is given to courts, that is, the more
activist they can be. See also footnote 80.
58 Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus, pp. 143–76.
59 See the chapters by K. Dzehtsiarou (Chapter 2), A. Follesdal (Chapter 9), C. Gearty
(Chapter 19), T. Kleinlein (Chapter 10), O. Bassok (Chapter 11), M. Amos (Chapter 12),
E. Bates (Chapter 3), K. Henrard (Chapter 7), S. Douglas-Scott (Chapter 8), L. Lixinski
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as a(n) (internal) goal of the Court and as a(n) (external) criterion for
evaluating EuC. Attempting to ‘domesticate’ a concept as elusive as
legitimacy,60 however, is inherently challenging. And this is all the more
the case if legitimacy is examined in relation to or in juxtaposition with
similarly vague and elusive concepts, such as authority.61 One cannot
help but wonder, then, how EuC can truly be legitimate as a method or
increase the Court’s external legitimacy when the outputs of consensus
analysis may allow for double standards62 in human rights protection or
may even pave the way towards regression.63
(Chapter 15), J. Větrovský (Chapter 6), F. de Londras (Chapter 14), D. Kagiaros
(Chapter 13) and J. Kukavica (Chapter 16).
60 For an overview, see D. Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, 2nd edn (Houndmills:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), especially chapter 11. On legitimacy in international law, see
the seminal work by T. M. Franck, ‘Legitimacy in the international system’ (1988) 82(4)
American Journal of International Law 705–59, especially pp. 725–59. On legitimacy in
human rights in international law, see J. Tasioulas, ‘Human rights, legitimacy, and
international law’ (2013) 58(1) The American Journal of Jurisprudence 1–25.
61 Franck, ‘Legitimacy’, p. 725. Among other works by A. von Bogdandy, see the papers he
co-authored with I. Venzke: ‘On the functions of international courts. An appraisal in
light of their burgeoning public authority’ (2013) 26 Leiden Journal of International Law
49–72; ‘In whose name? An investigation of international courts’ public authority and its
democratic justiﬁcation’ (2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 7–41. The
works cited here link authority with legitimacy. On EuC, the authority of the ECtHR and
(il)legitimacy, see L. R. Helfer, ‘Consensus, coherence and the European Convention on
Human Rights’ (1993) 26 Cornell International Law Journal 133–65 at 135. See also the
contributions by T. Kleinlein (Chapter 10), O. Bassok (Chapter 11) and E. Bates (Chap-
ter 3) in this book.
62 See in this volume the chapter by D. Kagiaros (Chapter 13) in particular. A typical
example of such double standards is the treatment of same-sex unions in the Court’s case
law. Relying on EuC, the ECtHR has established both a negative (Vallianatos and Others,
especially para. 91) and a positive duty (Oliari and others Appl. nos. 18766/11 and 36030/
11, judgment, 21 July 2015, especially para. 178) in favour of ofﬁcial recognition of same-
sex partnership. Mutatis mutandis, because of the absence of EuC, no right to marriage
exists for same-sex couples (Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, especially paras 101, 105–6; see
also Orlandi and others v. Italy Appl. nos. 26431/12, 26742/12 et al., judgment, 14 Decem-
ber 2017, especially paras 204–5, where the Court reiterated that no right to marriage
exists for same-sex couples but found a violation on the basis of the respondent state’s
failure to provide any form of recognition to a same-sex couple that was married in a
third country). This line of jurisprudence has the potential of leading to a separate-but-
equal regime in Europe, reminiscent of segregation in the United States and elsewhere.
V. P. Tzevelekos and P. Kapotas, ‘Hell is other people. Three arguments regarding the
ECtHR judgment on the exclusion of same-sex couples from civil partnership legislation
in Greece’ (2014) 39 The Books’ Journal, available at http://booksjournal.gr/παρεμβάσεις/
item/65-η-κόλαση-είμαστε-εμείς (in Greek).
63 See in this book the chapters by C. Djeffal (Chapter 4), L. Van den Eynde (Chapter 5),
D. Kagiaros (Chapter 13), N. N. Shuibhne (Chapter 18) and K. Dzehtsiarou (Chapter 2).
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1.3.3 Challenges of Comparisons across Legal Systems
The third part of the book moves beyond the normative borders of the
ECHR and explores the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of consensus analysis or
analogous interpretive tools in different (national, international and
supranational) legal systems, in Europe and beyond. As one would
expect, the challenges already discussed remain pertinent for any legal
system that consciously favours or avoids consensus-based judicial
reasoning in the process of founding human rights standards. But there
is one more challenge with which comparative lawyers are painfully
familiar and which comes with the territory of considering the role and
place of a legal doctrine in different legal systems. It goes without saying
that the idiosyncrasies of each legal system and the particularities in the
socio-legal environment may have an impact on the way consensus
analysis operates. What is of particular signiﬁcance in this regard is
whether the legal systems under scrutiny share a commitment to inte-
grationist goals.64 This entails that certain legal systems will be better
‘candidates’ for a comparison with the ECHR, and such comparisons are
more likely to yield fruitful results in so far as consensus analysis is
concerned. Regional human rights systems, for instance, may be a closer
match to the ECHR system than national (federal) legal systems or the
international system of human rights protection, although variations of
consensus-based reasoning may ﬁnd an application in any human rights
system.
1.4 An Ambitious Mapping Exercise: Structure and
Contents of the Book
Although EuC has been part of the ECtHR’s interpretative arsenal for
quite some time,65 it did not attract signiﬁcant academic interest until
relatively recently. Admittedly, there is a growing body of academic
literature on the question of evolutive/dynamic interpretation of human
64 The signiﬁcance of integration in this respect is also emphasised by the former Vice
President of the ECHR, Judge C. Rozakis, in his Foreword to this book. See also the
Preamble to the ECHR and Article 1(a) of the Statute of the Council of Europe, adopted
5 May 1949, entered into force 3 August 1949 ETS 1. Whether the ECtHR perceives itself
as a ‘vehicle’ for European integration and whether such an integrationist goal is among
the Court’s priorities is an interesting question that could, perhaps, be the object of
another volume.
65 See footnote 36.
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rights treaties in general and of the ECHR in particular.66 Many papers
touch upon EuC tangentially when discussing the margin of appreciation
doctrine,67 which has a much more prominent place in the literature on
the interpretation of the ECHR.68 With the exception of a fairly small
66 The literature on evolutive/dynamic interpretation is impressive in its abundance. For
some recent examples on the evolutive method in the ECHR system, see K. Dzehtsiarou,
‘European consensus and the evolutive interpretation of the European Convention on
Human Rights’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1730–45; K. Dzehtsiarou and C. O’Mah-
ony, ‘Evolutive interpretation of rights provisions: A comparison of the European Court
of Human Rights and the US Supreme Court’ (2013) 44 Columbia Human Rights Law
Review 309–65; G. Letsas, ‘The ECHR as a Living Instrument: Its Meaning and Legitim-
acy’, in A. Follesdal, B. Peters and G. Ulfstein (eds), Constituting Europe: The European
Court of Human Rights in a National, European and Global Context (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 106–41; More generally on the evolutive method,
see E. Bjorge, The Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2015); C. Djeffal, Static and Evolutive Interpretation. A Functional Reconstruction
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). See also footnote 17.
67 See footnote 19.
68 The margin of appreciation has been the object of extensive and thorough analysis in
legal scholarship on the ECHR system. Seminal examples include: H. C. Yourow, The
Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurispru-
dence (The Hague: Kluwer, 1996); Benvenisti, ‘Margin of appreciation’; S. Greer, The
Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under the European Convention on
Human Rights (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2000); Y. Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of
Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the
ECHR (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2002); J. A. Brauch, ‘The margin of appreciation and the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the rule of law’(2004)
11 Columbia Journal of European Law 113–50; O. Bakircioglu, ‘The application of the
margin of appreciation doctrine in freedom of expression and public morality cases’
(2007) 8 German Law Journal 711–34; Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation; M. Villiger,
‘Proportionality and the Margin of Appreciation: National Standard Harmonisation by
International Courts’, in C. Baudenbacher (ed.), Dispute Resolution (Stuttgart: German
Law Publisher, 2009), pp. 207–13; J. Kratochvil, ‘The inﬂation of the margin of appreci-
ation by the European Court of Human Rights’ (2011) 29 Netherlands Quarterly of
Human Rights 324–57; C. L. Rozakis, ‘Through the Looking Glass: An Insider’s View
of the Margin of Appreciation’, in P. Titiun (ed.), La Conscience des Droits: Mélanges en
l’honneur de Jean-Paul Costa (Paris: Dalloz, 2011), pp. 527–37; D. Spielmann, ‘Allowing
the right margin. The European Court of Human Rights and the national margin of
appreciation doctrine: Waiver or subsidiarity of European review?’ (2011–2012) 14
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 381–418; A Legg, The Margin of Appreci-
ation in International Human Rights Law: Deference and Proportionality (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012); M. Kopa, ‘The algorithm of the margin of appreciation doctrine
in light of the Protocol No. 15 amending the European Convention on Human Rights’
(2014) 14 International and Comparative Law Review 35–51; D. Spielmann, ‘Whither the
margin of appreciation’ (2014) Current Legal Problems 1–17; D. Tsaraparsanis, ‘The
margin of appreciation doctrine: A low-level institutional view’ (2015) 35 Legal Studies
675–97; E. Benvenisti, ‘The margin of appreciation, subsidiarity, and global challenges
to democracy’, Global Trust Working Paper, 05/2016; Y. Shany, ‘All roads lead to
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number of articles69 and the notable exception of Dzehtsiarou’s recent
monograph,70 there is a relative scarcity of studies with a particular focus
on EuC, given its theoretical importance and its immediate practical
impact on the shaping of European human rights standards.
Although this book intends to make a signiﬁcant contribution to this
body of literature, it would be a mistake to assume that any edited
volume can single-handedly address, in a comprehensive manner, the
complex nexus of questions that arise in connection to EuC. As we argue
in the last section of this introduction, there is considerably more
research still to be undertaken, especially when one takes into account
that several important issues raised by the use of consensus-based
reasoning fall well outside the narrow conﬁnes of doctrinal legal analysis
and straddle the boundaries of different disciplines. The real ambition
behind this volume, then, is to ignite and fuel the process of building
consensus on EuC, by studying its theoretical underpinnings and func-
tion, by identifying its impact on European human rights law and
beyond, and by assessing its merits and shortcomings in the context of
three broad and interconnected71 themes that constitute the backbone of
Strasbourg? Application of the margin of appreciation doctrine by the European Court of
Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee’ (2017) Journal of International
Dispute Settlement 1–19, idx011, https://doi-org.liverpool.idm.oclc.org/10.1093/jnlids/
idx011.
69 Examples include: Helfer, ‘Consensus, coherence’; T. König, A. Warntjen and
S. Burkhart, ‘The European Convention: Consensus without Unity?’, in S. Hug (ed.),
Policy-Making Processes and the European Constitution: A Comparative Study of Member
States and Accession Countries (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), pp. 23–34; P. Martens,
‘Perplexity of the National Judge Faced with the Vagaries of European Consensus’,
in Dialogue between Judges (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2008), available at
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Dialogue_2008_ENG.pdf; J. L. Murray, ‘Consensus: Con-
cordance, or Hegemony of Majority’, in Dialogue between Judges (Strasbourg: Council of
Europe, 2008), available at www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Dialogue_2008_ENG.pdf;
J. A. Brauch, ‘The dangerous search for an elusive consensus: What the Supreme Court
should learn from the European Court of Human Rights’ (2008–2009) 52 Howard Law
Journal 277–318; Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus; D. Regan, ‘European consensus:
A worthy endeavour for the European Court of Human Rights’ (2011) 14 Trinity College
Law Review 51–76; E. Myjer, ‘Pieter van Dijk and his Favourite Strasbourg Judgment:
Some Remarks on Consensus in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights’,
in M. van Roosmalen et al. (eds), Fundamental Rights and Principles: Liber Amicorum
Pieter van Dijk (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2013), pp. 49–71; Wildhaber, Hjartarson and
Donnelly, ‘No consensus on consensus?’; K. Dzehtsiarou and R. Pavel, ‘European Con-
sensus and the EU Accession to the ECHR’, in V. Kosta et al., The EU Accession,
pp. 309–23; Tzevelekos and Dzehtsiarou, ‘International custom making’.
70 Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus.
71 See footnote 8.
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the book. These three broad themes correspond to the three Parts of the
book. Parts I and II begin with a short introductory note intended to offer
a critical prelude to and set the scene for the chapters that follow, and
which showcases the work of (both early career and established) scholars
from different disciplinary legal perspectives, including human rights,
public international law, comparative constitutional law, EU law, legal
theory and philosophy. Part III follows a distinctive route and moves
away from EuC ‘proper’ and the jurisdictional focus on the ECHR. This
ﬁnal Part examines the possible ‘spill-over’ of EuC as a method of judicial
interpretation; as such, it is comprised by an eclectic selection of com-
parative chapters discussing consensus analysis or similar methods of
interpretation in the context of EU law, the Inter-American system and
the US Supreme Court (USSC) jurisprudence. Examination of consensus
analysis in the legal regimes included in Part III makes sense without the
need for different strands to be ‘pulled together’ by an introduction. The
book ends with a concluding chapter by Gearty that brings together
the three themes and casts a critical eye on the place and role of consen-
sus analysis in the ECHR system and in human rights law adjudication
more generally.
1.4.1 The Conceptualisation of EuC
The ﬁrst Part of the book is devoted to the conceptualisation of EuC. It
purports to provide the deﬁnitional groundwork for EuC and explore its
modus operandi. Chapters in this Part discuss the history of EuC,72 the
logic and methodology underpinning its function, and the relationship
between EuC and its altera pars, the margin of appreciation doctrine.73
They consider where consensus analysis is situated within the bigger
picture of international treaty interpretation,74 and they pursue lines of
enquiry that enhance our understanding of the mechanics, content and
role of EuC in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.
The questions explored in this ﬁrst Part are as wide-ranging as the
methodologies on display, and they reﬂect the depth and width of the
controversies that EuC generates, as Dzehtsiarou points out in his intro-
ductory note. Notwithstanding and despite the apparently different
72 Especially Chapter 3 by E. Bates.
73 See footnote 19.
74 See footnotes 9–11.
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perspectives they adopt, chapters in this part ‘converse’ with one another
and create a rich and nuanced conceptual canvas.
Bates, for instance, explores the historical role of consensus in the
development of the Convention system from its early years up to its
coming of age at the end of the twentieth century. He argues that,
throughout this ‘legitimacy-building era’, resort to consensus analysis
was an essential component of the Strasbourg ‘success story’, as it
reﬂected the reliance of the Convention system on an underlying ‘polit-
ical consensus’ of states on common European standards. Along similar
lines, both Henrard and Djeffal cast a critical eye on the what, the how
and the why of consensus analysis within the Convention system. Hen-
rard does so in light of the Convention’s overarching goal of effective
human rights protection. She argues that the Court uses EuC as a means
of justifying the appropriate level of scrutiny of restrictions, taking into
account both epistemological and legitimacy concerns. Djeffal, on the
other hand, attempts to reveal the internal logic of the consensus doctrine
within the Convention system through a four-stage analytical framework
that is designed to look at the deﬁnition, the function, the ascertainment
and the outcome of the EuC doctrine. He is keen to point out that the
Court should use EuC in the context of proportionality assessment and
balancing, rather than for the purpose of treaty interpretation.
Van den Eynde turns to examine consensus from the perspective of
(one category of ) ‘end users’, looking at the use of the EuC argument in
the amicus curiae briefs submitted to the ECtHR Grand Chamber by
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In doing so, she provides a
much-needed empirical backdrop to the wider debate on the meaning
and function(s) of EuC. Větrovský is also interested in usage and users,
but moves the focus of enquiry in a slightly different direction. Taking
his cue from the common supposition in EuC scholarship that there is
no single deﬁnition of ‘consensus’, he argues that scholars, true to a
Platonic philosophical tradition, are mistaken in presuming that the
absence of ‘essential properties’ in the Court’s deﬁnition of EuC renders
the concept ﬂawed or unworkable for users (including the Court itself ).
Be that as it may, Douglas-Scott highlights that the story of EuC is one
of convergence of different European legal systems and human rights
cultures towards ‘a shared human rights disposition’. In considering
whether this convergence may have been arrived at through different
evolutionary routes, Douglas-Scott draws insights from the case law of
the Court, while also enlisting the help of master story-teller Jorge Luis
Borges.
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1.4.2 The Normative Evaluation of EuC
The second Part takes a more evaluative turn, moving on to question the
usefulness, appropriateness and desirability of both EuC per se and its
outputs. The emphasis here is primarily on normative analysis that
purports to grapple with broader questions of legitimacy.75 After all,
EuC is a method of interpretation that permits an international, quasi-
constitutional court to recognise and set standards of human rights
protection that are absent from the text of the Convention and which
might even go beyond the will and intentions of its drafters.76 As already
argued, a number of moral and political dilemmas underpin the analyt-
ical endeavours undertaken in this Part of the book, including the
dilemma on the appropriate level of decision making (international or
national)77 and the dilemma on the ﬁnal arbiters (courts or parliaments)
when it comes to questions pertaining to the protection of rights in
democratic societies.78 This latter dilemma may be seen as echoing
Ronald Dworkin’s seminal work on the appropriate basis for judicial
decision making (the ‘principles v. policy’ dichotomy, especially in hard
cases).79 But it is also reminiscent of well-documented academic debates
on whether and to what extent majoritarian justiﬁcations may be legit-
imate or even crucial in answering human rights questions and what role
(international) courts can (or should) play in that respect.80 The counter-
majoritarian thesis is prevalent in general human rights scholarship, and
75 See also footnotes 59, 60 and 61.
76 Cf. Bjorge, The Evolutionary Interpretation, p. 2, associating the evolutive interpretation
with the intention of the signatories to a treaty.
77 See also footnote 30 on the obvious links to the doctrine of subsidiarity.
78 This is a question addressed to different extents and from different perspectives in a
number of chapters in the book, but see especially the contribution by T. Kleinlein
(Chapter 10), who discusses the foundations of the democratic legitimation of the ECtHR
in light of the emerging doctrine of procedural rationality.
79 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978),
pp. 82 et seq. See also in this book the chapters by S. Douglas-Scott (Chapter 8) and
J. T. Theilen (Chapter 17).
80 Admittedly, these types of questions may be examined from a variety of perspectives.
Examples include the representation-reinforcing theory and the so-called new public law
movement in the United States, justifying judicial intervention to correct democratic
failure. See, for instance, W. N. Eskridge and G. Peller, ‘The new public law movement:
Moderation as a postmodern cultural form’ (1991) 89 Michigan Law Review 707, and
J. H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1980). See also footnote 56.
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the same is true about the body of work focusing on EuC, including
many of the contributions in this book.81
Drawing from this rich literature, Follesdal, in his introductory note,
pulls together common threads that run across the chapters in this Part
of the book. After sketching the Court’s practice and identifying several
ambiguous aspects of it, he goes on to suggest that, although EuC analysis
does not render the ECtHR interpretation of a particular Convention
provision more democratic, it may still help uncover hitherto unnoticed
discrimination against certain groups. This later point is put forward
most forcefully by Kagiaros, who argues that the weight the Court places
on EuC in discrimination cases has been inconsistent. While, in some
cases, the Court takes full advantage of the ﬂexibility of the consensus
tool to reinforce the minority status of the applicants and to narrow the
margin of appreciation, in other cases, the existence or lack of consensus
seems to be the sole determining factor to the outcome of the application.
The difﬁcult relationship between EuC and the Court’s democratic
legitimacy constitutes the focal point for most chapters in this Part.
Bassok claims that much of the difﬁculty that runs deep into the ECtHR’s
use of the EuC doctrine can be explained when one considers the pivotal
role of EuC in the Court’s understanding of its own legitimacy. Using an
empirical analysis of the ECtHR’s judgments, Bassok demonstrates that
the ECtHR views judicial legitimacy as predicated on public conﬁdence.
By ensuring, then, that its judgments reﬂect consensus in the contracting
states, the Court strengthens its claim to public conﬁdence and legitim-
acy. Kleinlein offers a different explanation of the link between EuC and
the Court’s legitimacy, relying on two models of legitimation developed
by legal scholars speciﬁcally for the democratic legitimation of inter-
national and domestic courts: a ‘formal model’ and a ‘control model’. He
identiﬁes patterns in the Court’s case law in which the Court seems to
combine EuC with a procedural approach to the margin of appreciation,
and he argues that such a legitimation strategy opens up spaces for
democratic contestation and deliberation.
Amos attempts to test whether such a legitimation strategy based on
EuC has been successful in assuaging British concerns with the Court and
the Convention system, and in keeping the UK on side in the post-
Brighton era. Her analysis reveals that consensus-based reasoning is no
match for highly politicised issues, where what really matters is the
81 See footnotes 22 and 51.
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degree of domestic support for the underlying moral message of the
judgment. De Londras turns this line of enquiry on its head and con-
siders what happens when EuC clashes with the democratic will of the
people as expressed through referenda at the national level. She examines
whether a referendum-emergent constitutional provision that goes
against consensus at the European level ought to be treated as sufﬁciently
weighty to preserve a wide margin of appreciation for the ‘outlier’, and
she cautions against the possible use of EuC by the Court as a way of
avoiding taking a stance on difﬁcult questions.
1.4.3 Consensus Analysis Outside the ECHR System
The third Part of the book considers whether interpretive methodologies
similar to EuC are (or should be) part of judicial reasoning in contiguous
or comparable legal systems. As already explained, this comparative
exercise encompasses different types of legal systems, from a regional
mechanism of human rights protection with its own normative and
institutional framework (the Inter-American system),82 to a system over-
lapping with the ECHR on issues of rights protection (European Union
Law),83 and a national legal order that exerts considerable inﬂuence in
the development of human rights doctrine worldwide (the United States,
and in particular, US constitutional law). The role of the respective
courts – the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (I-ACtHR), the
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the USSC – that
drive interpretive progress in these systems is crucial. Contributions in
this part of the book examine whether analogies can usefully be drawn
between EuC and comparable doctrines in other jurisdictions and
whether EuC itself has transferable qualities that may render its trans-
plantation into different systems possible and desirable.
Starting with the Inter-American system, Lixinski argues that the
I-ACtHR uses consensus analysis tentatively and as a subsidiary
interpretive tool, as the Court’s true allegiance lies with the pro homine
principle that favours interpretations of human rights. When the
I-ACtHR seeks consensus, Lixinski claims, it does so more often in the
international legal order than in the domestic law and practice of the
states parties to the Inter-American system, which seems to suggest that
the Court is using consensus analysis as a means of systemic integration.
82 See the chapter by L. Lixinski (Chapter 15).
83 See the chapters by J. T. Theilen (Chapter 17) and N. N. Shuibhne (Chapter 18).
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The USSC, on the other hand, is closer to the ECtHR in how it
incorporates consensus analysis in its reasoning. In fact, according to
Kukavica, not only does the USSC resort to ‘national consensus’ in its
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, but it also conceptualises consensus
in a more consistent manner compared to the ECtHR. Through this
direct comparison, Kukavica is able to make suggestions on possible
courses of action with a view to improving the clarity and consistency
of EuC in the ECHR system.
Back on European normative soil, Shuibhne explores how consensus-
based reasoning has (not) shaped the CJEU jurisprudence on EU citizen-
ship. Despite an apparent but partial nod to an EU version of consensus
analysis in an early ruling, the CJEU has steered clear from consensus
analysis when determining the ‘practical effect’ of freedom of movement
and citizenship rights. Shuibhne leads us ﬁrst down a counterfactual
path, considering whether the absence of a more consensus-based
approach in the formative years of EU citizenship law was a missed
opportunity. Her analysis then moves in a more prospective direction,
attempting to gauge the implications of a possible emerging national
consensus that could challenge current EU citizenship law.
This line of enquiry is picked up by Theilen, albeit within a slightly
different context. They set out to examine how the ECtHR and the CJEU
use vertically comparative reasoning (rather than consensus analysis per
se), that is, comparative reference to the national laws of the states parties
to the respective systems. Theilen acknowledges that the two European
courts belong to different adjudicatory cultures and argues that this may
explain why the CJEU opts for general references to common consti-
tutional principles, while the ECtHRmakes concrete references to national
applicable laws. What Theilen proposes is that the correct balance on the
generality/speciﬁcity (of comparisons) spectrum can be found by making
use of a theoretical construct akin to a Rawlsian reﬂective equilibrium.
1.5 Epilogue: A Note on Limits and Limitations
The key question with which this introductory note attempts to grapple is
whether and how it is possible to accurately conceptualise the EuC ‘game’
and understand its modus operandi, when the ‘game master’ has not
offered a convincing and comprehensive rulebook. The answer to this
key question reﬂects the ambition of this book, but also its limitations.
What we aim to do is contribute to the conceptualisation of EuC, not only
because of the importance of this interpretive tool per se, but also because
understanding the rules of consensus-based reasoning is a precondition
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for assessing its value and desirability in the ECHR system, as well as its
transferability across comparable legal systems. It is important to bear
in mind that disagreements on the nature and modus operandi of EuC
will inevitably boil down to disagreements on fundamental questions
regarding the powers and role of the ECtHR in the European polity/ies,
as the ﬁnal arbiter of morally and politically delicate choices.
The extent to which this book can actually contribute to the building
of a consensus on consensus, however, will hinge on how successfully it
can overcome the obstacles identiﬁed in Section 1.3 of this chapter. As we
already explained, a lot depends on whether EuC, as a tool, is static or
dynamic (itself subject to evolution) and conceptually ﬁxed as a singular
‘entity’ or a conceptual ‘matrix’ from which the Court derives or con-
structs up-to-date human rights standards.84 There are two ﬁnal words of
caution that we feel we owe our readers.
The ﬁrst concerns the sheer range of questions one may ask on or
around EuC. We are aware of the fact that the conﬁnes of a project like
ours inevitably entail that important questions will be left underexplored
or untouched. Whether national referenda, for instance, are an accept-
able source for the establishment of human rights and whether EuC
should be informed by referenda could be the object of a separate book.
The same is true with regard to the possibility of a ‘regressive consensus’
and the associated question of lowering human rights standards, which is
especially pertinent at times of a revival of nationalisms in Europe and
elsewhere, of an enfeeblement of the état de droit within illiberal democ-
racies and of growing scepticism vis-à-vis the ECHR system.85 A different
route would be to examine EuC purely from the perspective of public
international law. Regardless of the interrelationship between EuC and
other methods contained in the VCLT, it would be useful to research
more thoroughly the usefulness of EuC in the interpretation of jus cogens
rules or whether EuC is akin to customary international law.86 And, of
course, the use of consensus-based reasoning outside the ECHR system is
84 See footnotes 49 and 50.
85 Regarding the latter aspect, see especially in this book the chapter by M. Amos
(Chapter 12).
86 On that question, see Tzevelekos and Dzehtsiarou, ‘International custom making’;
V. P. Tzevelekos, ‘The Making of International Human Rights Law’, in C. M. Brölmann
and Y. Radi (eds), Research Handbook on the Theory and Practice of International Law-
Making (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2016), pp. 329–53 at pp. 345–7; and especially and
more authoritatively, I. Ziemele, ‘Customary international law in the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights. The method’ (2013) 12 The Law and Practice of
International Courts and Tribunals 243–52.
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only partially covered in the book.87 Whether and how far consensus
analysis is or should be used in federal national systems or in the UN
system of human rights protection remains, to a large extent, under-
explored.88 Interesting and important as such questions may be, there is
only so much one edited collection can do.
The second word of caution is methodological and speaks to the
interdisciplinary nature of the enquiry. Although we concede that
lawyers should be at the forefront of answering questions pertaining to
the protection of rights, this does not mean that themethods used in such
an evaluative endeavour should remain conﬁned to one discipline. As
such, we are strong advocates of the need to enlist help from different
disciplinary backgrounds and to establish collaborations that straddle
traditional disciplinary boundaries, if we are to get a clear sense of the
full picture. We strongly believe, therefore, that EuC should (also) be
explored by social scientists using advanced quantitative methods of
analysis as a means to provide a solid empirical foundation for its
conceptualisation.89 We concede, of course, that there is still a lot of
ground to cover in this direction. But, for lawyers and social scientists
alike, this is reason for optimism more than anything else. After all, as
long as the ECtHR continues to refuse to draw an authoritative ‘road-
map’ on EuC, this task will continue to rest primarily with academia.
87 See the chapter by J. Kukavica (Chapter 16).
88 But see on the UN system, for example, Shany, ‘All roads lead to Strasbourg?’.
89 Quantitative text analysis has been employed extensively and for various purposes with
regard to the USSC. For examples, see P. C. Corley, P. M. Collins Jr and B. Calvin, ‘Lower
court inﬂuence on U.S. Supreme Court opinion content’ (2011) 73 The Journal of Politics
31–44; M. Evans, W. V. Mclntosh, L. Lin and C. L. Cates, ‘Recounting the courts?
Applying automated content analysis to enhance empirical legal research’ (2007) 4
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 1007–39. Quantitative analysis of the ECHR regime,
on the other hand, is limited, with the notable exception of E. Voeten. The data he has
collected is available at: http://faculty.georgetown.edu/ev42/ICdata_ﬁles/Page364.htm.
See E. Voeten, ‘Domestic implementation of European Court of Human Rights judg-
ments: Legal infrastructure and government effectiveness matter: A reply to Dia Ana-
gnostou and Alina Mungiu-Pippidi’ (2014) 25 European Journal of International Law
229–38. See also the very recent work by N. Aletras, D. Tsarapatsanis, D. Preoţiuc-Pietro
and V. Lampos, ‘Predicting judicial decisions of the European Court of Human Rights:
A natural language processing perspective’ (2016) PeerJ Computer Science, DOI 10.7717/
peerj-cs.93.
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